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Abstract
Background: This article aims to investigate the processes, actors and other influencing factors behind the
development and the national scale-up of the One Stop Crisis Centre (OSCC) policy and the subsequent health
model for violence-response.
Methods: Methods used included policy analysis of legal, policy and regulatory framework documents, and in-
depth interviews with key informants from governmental and non-governmental organisations in two States of
Malaysia.
Results: The findings show that women’s NGOs and health professionals were instrumental in the formulation and
scaling-up of the OSCC policy. However, the subsequent breakdown of the NGO-health coalition negatively
impacted on the long-term implementation of the policy, which lacked financial resources and clear policy
guidance from the Ministry of Health.
Conclusion: The findings confirm that a clearly-defined partnership between NGOs and health staff can be very
powerful for influencing the legal and policy environment in which health care services for intimate partner
violence are developed. It is critical to gain high level support from the Ministry of Health in order to
institutionalise the violence-response across the entire health care system. Without clear operational details and
resources policy implementation cannot be fully ensured and taken to scale.
Background
Globally, evidence on interventions seeking to address
violence against women (VAW) by integrating specific
services at the health sector level remains fairly limited.
There are few well evaluated examples of violence-service
initiatives in Southeast Asia, where many focus on rape
and are run by NGOs [1]. The Malaysia One Stop Crisis
Centre (OSCC) model is relatively unique in its imple-
mentation of a large scale model for violence-response,
and other countries in the South East Asian region are
replicating this approach [2-4]. However, little data are
available on the processes and influences that led to its
creation and expansion to national level.
Malaysia was among the first countries in the region to
adopt a law on partner violence: the Domestic Violence
(DV) Act of 1994 [5]. National prevalence data on vio-
lence against women (VAW) is still not available today,
though the University Sains Malaysia is currently under-
taking a national prevalence study on VAW. However,
anecdotal evidence suggests that intimate partner vio-
lence (IPV) and non-partner sexual violence are quite
widespread across the country [6]. More than 2000 abuse
cases are reported each year to the Police Department
and other agencies [7] (table 1); though, they represent
only the tip of the iceberg.
Recent studies suggest that IPV is also quite prevalent
in neighbouring countries like Thailand, Philippines and
Indonesia [8-10].
Although rape crisis services and a related protocol
were available since late 1986 [11], a more comprehen-
sive health sector response to violence against women
started in 1994, with the first One-Stop Crisis Centre
(OSCC) established in Kuala Lumpur; and in 1996, with
a specific directive of the Ministry of Health [12]. This
paper employs a policy analysis of the Malaysian OSCC
model in order to illumine the driving forces behind its
creation and scale-up and provide lessons not only to
improve the health care to abused women in Malaysia,
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but also to inform and influence the development of a
health sector response to partner violence in other coun-
tries that are struggling with creating and scaling-up
similar models of care.
Methods
The paper explores the processes, actors and other
influencing factors behind the development and the
national scale-up of the OSCC directive in Malaysia. It
first describes the contextual factors and processes that
led to the enactment of the DV Law and the establish-
ment of a pilot OSCC service. Then it focuses on the
roll out of the policy at national and district levels and
what factors and actors influenced it. It concludes by
discussing whether establishment of OSCCs is a suitable
way of addressing VAW, especially at A&E.
This study is the result of a policy analysis conducted
in Malaysia in 2007 which involved analysis of legal, pol-
icy and regulatory framework documents, and in-depth
interviews with key informants from governmental and
non-governmental organisations in two States of Malay-
sia, namely Kelantan and Penang. A total of 20 inter-
views were conducted between January and April 2007,
details shown in Table 2.
In-depth interviews were conducted in English, tape-
recorded, transcribed and uploaded to NVIVO (N7), a
qualitative software package, for coding and managing
narrative text for analysis.
The use of a policy analysis lens permits a detailed
analysis of actors and processes that help to understand
the course Malaysia took in establishing OSCCs and the
challenges it has faced in scaling them up. The policy
analysis model used in this article - or health policy tri-
angle model - consists of four elements that are essen-
tial to analyse factors influencing the policy process and
the implementation of health policies: 1) actors (indivi-
dual, groups or organizations), 2) content, 3) context
(situational, structural, cultural and international fac-
tors), and 4) processes (problem identification, policy
formulation, policy implementation and evaluation)
[13,14].
The four components from the policy analysis frame-
work were employed closely to examine existing policies
and guidance documents on IPV in Malaysia, and pro-
cesses used by various actors to develop and scale-up
the OSCC services. The focus on these elements helped
analyse the various approaches used by the health sector
to implement IPV services. In particular, it helped
answer questions like: “who was supportive of which
intervention? Who was against it and why? How did the
organization manage to win support from opposing
agencies? What did the policy state?
Beside the “policy triangle” approach, in our discus-
sion we also draw on Hall and Kingdon’s models of
agenda setting [15,16] and the implementation frame-
works, principally the top-down (and more prescriptive)
[17] and bottom-up approaches, which are more focused
on the role that different individuals play in policy
implementation particularly lower-level officials or
“street-level bureaucrats” [18]. We use these to help
describe and explore how violence against women
became a legitimate policy issue for the Malaysian
Table 1 Statistics for rape, domestic violence and child abuse cases of 3 organizations: OSCC, Police and Welfare
Departments from years 2004 - 2006
Organisation/Year 2004 2005 2006
Rape IPV CA* Rape IPV CA Rape IPV CA
OSCC na na na 1,099 1,851 160 1,454 2,159 214
Police Department 1,765 3,101 148 1,931 3,093 189 1,561 2,171 108
Welfare Department na 560 1,656 na 421 1,800 na 463 1999
Source: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Women and Community Development and Department of Social Welfare, Malaysia.
*CA: Child Abuse
Table 2 Respondents interviewed
State/level Type of Respondent Number of respondents
Penang State Policy makers from the Department of Health 3
Representatives from collaborating agencies (police and social welfare) 2
NGO representatives 2
Kelantan State Policy-makers from the State Health Department 2
Representatives from collaborating agencies (police and social welfare) 2
Representative from local NGO 1
National Level Senior-policy makers at Ministry of Health 3
NGOs representatives 4
Health provider from the capital’s hospital 1
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government, how the OSCC became a national policy,
and how it was scaled-up at State and district level.
Document analysis
A document analysis of relevant Malaysian laws, policies,
regulations, and policy statements on domestic violence
and related issues was undertaken to analyse content, sta-
tus of implementation and policy implications on the pro-
vision of services. The review of policy documents and
existing data and reports helped inform the national level
analysis of actors and structural factors and was used as
part of the background information to inform the analysis
of the interviews with key informants and policy-makers.
In-depth interviews were conducted with key infor-
mants, including policy makers, women’s influential
NGOs, and representatives from government agencies
working on IPV (at national and regional level), to identify
the policy and organisational context, training, follow up,
supervision, quality assessments and other measures that
are taken to develop and sustain the integration of services
for abused women. Interviews also helped understand
where the emphasis on domestic violence lays at national
level (e.g. strong focus on legal issues or on public health
ones) and how this may impact on the delivery of services.
Semi-structured topic guides for the policy-makers
included the following questions:
- Government and Ministry of Health (MOH) stance
towards IPV: to understand whether there is a
national support or not, and whether IPV is consid-
ered a priority issue
- history of policy process (asked primarily at
national level): to understand the processes and
actors behind the OSCC policy implementation
- guidelines and protocol: to get a sense of the gui-
dance on IPV provided by the top management
- training and resources: to get a sense of the
emphasis and importance given to training by MOH
- networks and alliances around violence: to under-
stand collaboration process
- perceptions and views around IPV: to get a sense
of their views towards IPV across units and agencies
This structure tried to encourage respondents to dis-
cuss matters they might have otherwise not revealed
without prompting such as their beliefs towards IPV. It
also ensured that issues relevant to the research were
not completely overlooked and allowed comparison
across sites and between States.
Sampling and recruitment
Snowball sampling was used to identify key informants
who were knowledgeable about the research topic and
the researched model, with the assistance of the local
partners. Respondents were selected according to their
profession and their experience with violence issues and
their connection with OSCCs. A total of 20 people were
interviewed, until we reached theoretical saturation and
no more new contacts were suggested by key
informants.
Ethical approval has been granted by the Ethical Com-
mittees of the LSHTM School and the World Health
Organisation. Ethical permission for the study has also
been granted by the national ethical review committee
in Malaysia. Additional permissions to conduct inter-
views with health providers in the selected hospitals
were also obtained by the State Health Departments in
Penang and Kelantan.
Written informed consent was obtained from each
participant in the study. Each informant was asked to
sign an informed consent form and anonymity of all
information was assured by asking them whether they
agreed to be quoted in disseminating reports.
An analysis method framework was used to analyse
the interview findings, which consists of a content analy-
sis method allowing for a systematic classification and
organisation of data by major themes, categories and
concepts within a thematic framework [19]. This
approach encourages the preservation and integrity of
the voices and accounts of the interviewees, keeping the
researcher grounded in the data, as the information is
summarised and classified within a thematic matrix all
along the analysis [19].
Results
1. Front-line actors establish legitimacy of violence as a
national problem, shape service protocols and pilot OSCC
services
In Malaysia, violence against women (VAW), and inti-
mate partner violence (IPV) in particular, has always
been perceived as a private matter. However, during the
early 1980s, things began to change due to the rise of sev-
eral women’s organisations and NGOs [12], which was
crucial in making violence against women a more public
issue [12]. Women’s groups addressed issues of violence
against women initially through legislative efforts [20].
Analysis of policy and organisational documents showed
that, in 1985, a Joint Action Group (JAG) was created as
an umbrella group of individual women and five women’s
NGOs (Women’s Aid Organisation, Association of
Women’s Lawyers, Malaysian Trade Unions Congress
Women’s Section, University Women’s Association and
the Selangor and Federal Territory Consumers’ Associa-
tion) working together on violence issues [21]. A timeline
of main events described here - resulting from the docu-
ment analysis - is outlined in Table 3.
Results from the document analysis showed that in
1989, JAG started lobbying for legal provisions to
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address cases of domestic violence, as no previous law
existed on protecting women from marital abuse
[12,22]. It was only in 1994 that the Domestic Violence
(DV) bill was tabled in Parliament and finally enacted in
1996 as a criminal legislation [20]. Women’s NGOs
were catalysts in the adoption of the DV Act and in
pushing the issue of intimate partner violence forward
in both the public arena and the Government agenda.
In parallel to the development of a legal basis for
recognising and responding to DV, front-line health
workers and NGO groups were active in trying to estab-
lish formal service protocols for managing victims of
DV and pushing for a coordinated multi-sector response
that led to the establishment of a pilot OSCC. Prior to
1993, services for abused women existed but were pro-
vided in an ad hoc manner and in small scale [23,24].
The development of an interdisciplinary model of health
care to abused women was heavily influenced by one
influential doctor at the General Hospital in Kuala Lum-
pur (HKL) [Information given during discussions with
key informants in Kelantan and Kuala Lumpur]. An
interviewee said that the doctor recognised the need to
do more than treat physical problems:
[..] she had actually said that when many women
who are abused come to the hospital, she saw that
they wanted to talk to her more ...[...] the need is
more of psychological, counselling rather than fixing
a broken arm [...] the doctor said that she had no
time to talk to [her], she can only talk about fixing
her broken arms and in the hospital they see 300
patients at a time and so she cannot be sitting there
doing counselling with the women ...[...] [KL/35,
female]
The female doctor pushed for collaboration beyond
the health sector with women’s NGOs, legal and reli-
gious groups [25] (Interviews with key informants, Kuala
Lumpur, February-March 2007). In December 1993, a
national seminar on “Interagency Management of bat-
tered women” was held [25,26]. Subsequently, in 1994,
the first OSCC was created as a pilot project at the
Kuala Lumpur Hospital to support survivors of physical
and sexual violence [27].
Based on the OSCC concept, all services - medical,
counselling and police services - would be administered
at the hospital itself, within the Accident & Emergency
(A&E) Department. Legal aid and religious support
would be offered upon referral [25]. The link between
clinical services and NGO support was crucial in the
establishment of OSCC. As part of the process, some
women’s advocate volunteers would be on 24-hour call
to respond to calls from the A&E to assist abused
women and to counsel them when arriving at the hospi-
tal [25]. The initial expectation from the medical sector
was that they would focus primarily on treatment, while
the counselling and long-term support was given by
volunteers from women’s NGOs. On the other hand,
women’s NGOs thought that they would only cover the
counselling temporarily until more social workers would
be seconded to the OSCCs.
At that time I think we [NGOs] were asking for full
time workers, you know, full time social workers to be
stationed at the One Stop Crisis Centre. As we were
providing services, we realize that we shouldn’t be
doing this on the long term because it should be
really the responsibility of the State to provide the
social workers to be there. [KL/35, female]
Though crucial, the nature of the NGO/health part-
nership - and the subsequent responsibilities - was
never really spelled out properly or discussed formally
between the two parties. Interviews with key infor-
mants made it clear that from the very beginning there
seemed to be a misunderstanding between women’s
Table 3 Timeline of main events in the development of DV policy and the establishment of OSCCs
1985 Creation of Joint Action Group against violence against women (JAG) to lobby for a law against domestic violence
1991 JAG presented a Bill on DV to Government
1993 National seminar on “Interagency Management of battered women” held in Kuala Lumpur
1994 Adoption of the DV Bill
1994 First Pilot OSCC in the A&E of the Hospital Kuala Lumpur
1996 DV Bill enacted as a criminal legislation
1996 OSCC protocol was fully adopted at HKL
Creation of a second OSCC in Penang
Ministry of Health (MOH) circular on the creation of OSCC at all public hospitals
Late 90’s NGOs in Kuala Lumpur withdrew from OSCC in Kuala Lumpur
2004 MOH official letter to all hospitals to collect information about OSCC
DV: domestic violence; HKL: Hospital Kuala Lumpur.
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organisations and the medical sector on the role to be
played by NGOs1
We [NGOs] thought that we should slowly back up
and it should be now the State player that should be
running it effectively without us in there. [...] We told
them [the hospital people in charge of OSCC] ‘call on
us for the running of the gender sensitizing programs,
include us in the awareness, but in term of the ser-
vices then it’s your baby, you take care of it’. [KL/36,
female]
On the other hand, the MOH did not seem to absorb
the idea that OSCC should be primarily a health pack-
age fully supported by public services. This tension
became an important factor in the weak scale-up of the
initiative.
Between 1994 and 1996, an OSCC protocol was fully
adopted at HKL [25], together with hospital guidelines
for the management of OSCC cases. The hospital Kuala
Lumpur also called for regular interagency meetings
with partners from the Police, Social Welfare, Legal Aid
and NGOs, which helped improve OSCC services, and,
indirectly, forced the government agencies to monitor
their services.
Front-line health workers and NGOs/women’s groups
were instrumental in bringing the issue of violence to
the attention of policy-makers, pushing for legal
response and showing that OSCCs could work. How-
ever, there was a critical breakdown in understanding of
the roles and responsibilities between NGOs and Gov-
ernment agencies (hospitals in particular) that was to
prove very damaging for sustaining the scaling up of the
OSCC model.
1. Policy Development: the lack of policy clarity over
responsibilities and need for careful balancing of
Government - NGO relations
Despite the adoption of the DV Act and the running of
a successful pilot of a coordinated model of violence-
response at the hospital level, the Ministry of Health
had not yet developed a formal policy on the health sec-
tor response to violence against women2. In 1996, after
the development of the first piloted OSCC in Kuala
Lumpur, women’s NGOs lobbied for the creation of a
similar set up in the main regional hospital in Penang. It
was only after the creation of this second OSCC (thanks
to the NGOs’ lobby) that the Ministry of Health became
officially involved in activities related to OSCCs and
VAW and announced the intention of replicating OSCC
structures throughout Malaysia (interview, women’s
NGO representative, Penang, February 2007).
Subsequent to this event, all the elements were in
place for the national legitimisation of OSCC: a well-
developed hospital structure, a management protocol,
two functioning OSCCs, and the lobbying from the
women’s NGOs. In the same year (1996), the Medical
Development Division of MOH sent out a circular con-
taining clear instructions on how to establish compre-
hensive services for rape and abuse victims through
OSCCs [28] stating that all government hospitals should
develop a One Stop Crisis Centre in order to fight vio-
lence against women.
Despite being a policy landmark for OSCC creation
and the provision of services to abused women, the
1996 MOH circular did not specify how the centres
should be created, except that a variety of hospital units
should be involved and it should be managed by various
agencies in a way that encouraged multidisciplinary
coordination [28]. It was unclear who should direct
OSCCs, and how to implement them at district facilities
with no specialised care and very few NGOs outside the
capital city.
KL [Kuala Lumpur] is quite lucky because they have
few active NGOs. In many towns they don’t, so it’s
very scattered in terms of accessibility and support.
[PP/22, male]
In reality, it was very much left at the discretion of
each hospital’s director to develop its own procedures.
No further guidelines or procedures have been devel-
oped by the Ministry of Health.
Interviewees suggested that the strong women’s lobby
was instrumental in pushing MOH to support the crea-
tion of OSCCs throughout Malaysia.
[..] I think the women’s NGOs were instrumental to
push for the OSCC in this country [...] we were very
concerned about the kind of treatment women should
get if they go for medical help. So I think we were the
one who pushed for the setting up of the OSCC. [PP/
10, female]
Furthermore, the partnership that developed between
NGOs and hospital professionals and thus with the
MOH was crucial for women’s NGOs in order to push
for integrated services to abused women within the
entire health care system. Within the Malaysian hier-
archical system, it would have been otherwise impossible
for NGOs to penetrate and influence the health sector
and the top Ministerial level without the internal sup-
port of the hospital (Head of A&E) and MOH. The fact
that the initial implementation process was government-
led (by MOH and hospital particularly) added credibility
to the request for specific services for abused women
and to the entire process, and made it acceptable for
other government agencies to collaborate (rather than
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just having NGOs, because of the historical antagonism
between women’s NGOs and Ministries).
It [Interagency Committee] was coordinated by the
hospital people. [...] It was easy because it was a gov-
ernment department, the hospital itself, calling the
other government departments [...] because if we
[NGOs] were coordinating it and we were calling
they [government agencies] would then say ‘oh, what
do now the NGOs want from us?’. But because it was
all State players so the coordination was definitely
much easier. [KL/35, female]
The pilot project in HKL gave legitimacy to the
expansion of OSCC services and helped the government
recognise violence against women as a national health
problem which needed action. However, the lack of pol-
icy clarity over roles and responsibilities across the var-
ious actors - NGOs, health staff, other agencies - called
for a more careful balancing of Government - NGO
relations.
1. Policy implementation: challenges to scaling-up
revealed
The establishment of the OSCC was planned in stages.
By the end of December 1996, all State hospitals were
to have an OSCC, while all district hospitals should
have had one by 1997 [28]. In reality, based upon inter-
views with key informants and providers, it took much
longer for district hospitals to integrate OSCC services
and they faced two important challenges.
First, the implementation of OSCCs relied heavily on
NGOs providing counselling and support services, but
NGOs working on violence issues were in short supply
and did not have a presence in many States. More criti-
cally, in the late 1990s, NGOs gradually stopped sup-
porting OSCCs actively because their on-site advocacy
services could not be sustained in the long term, as they
did not receive any additional funding.
Second, as supported by the findings from the docu-
ment analysis, a crucial flaw in the policy formulation
and its rolling out nationally was related to the fact that
in the MOH circular, it was clearly stated that no addi-
tional budget would be given to hospitals to establish
such centres [28]. Key informants also suggested that
the implementation of the OSCCs was not a top priority
for the MOH.
The OSCCs are physically there but then they are not
staffed, they don’t have enough human resources. [...]
I felt that they [MOH] were not willing to put in
extra money. They did not want to fund it.. they
didn’t see the need of putting in money. I think it is
just a political will, it was not their priority,
otherwise they would have pumped some money into
it. [KL/35, female]
In October 2004, MOH sent a letter to all hospitals to
ensure that they had set up OSCCs properly and to col-
lect information about these services [29]. The emphasis
was on the physical infrastructure and layout of the
room, rather than on managerial issues and processes
around the OSCC. To date, this has been the last minis-
terial directive sent by MOH on OSCCs.
Our key informant interviews suggested that without
the full support from NGOs on site and from the top
policy level, the model got “more medical with less focus
on women’s needs” (Interview with key informant, Kuala
Lumpur, April 2007) and its survival became more and
more dependent on the existence of “in-house cham-
pions“ who would coordinate and support the pro-
gramme within the hospital. Without such medical
figure on-site, without additional resources from the
policy level and without the support of any women’s
groups, some OSCCs were left with a fragile support
framework or would “disappear silently“ (email
exchange with key informant from Kelantan, August
2008).
The lack of financial commitment on the part of the
Government was a major flaw. Nonetheless, the dedica-
tion of front-line staff was such that most hospital did
in fact establish OSCCs, but funding constraints meant
they were quite variable in their ability to roll out ser-
vices. Consequently, there was increasing “medicalisa-
tion” of services and disconnection of broader NGO
inputs, leaving many OSCCs with minimal support in
place.
Discussion
The study findings confirm other studies’ evidence
about the importance of looking at the interaction of
actors, context and content [14] as a starting point for
investigation. In particular, the research provided a key
lesson for each stage of the policy cycle in relation to
the Malaysian response to domestic violence. While this
framework is useful, a range of other policy theories
also give insight for understanding what was going on in
the establishment and expansion of OSCCs in Malaysia
[15,16,18,30,31].
First, the study confirms that the 1994 DV Law gave
IPV what policy theorists in the literature refer to as
“legitimacy“ [15]. With a legitimate problem defined, the
success of the OSCC pilot meant that OSCCs acquired
national credibility as a feasible policy solution to the
VAW problem, resulting in official MOH support on
the issue. Similar to Hall [15], John Kingdon’s theory of
agenda setting [16] holds that in addition to a legitimate
problem and a defined solution (Hall’s ‘feasibility’),
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political will (or what Hall calls ‘support’) is needed for
policy change. The joint push by NGOs and influential
hospital staff on the importance of OSCCs showed how
front-line staff - the so-called Lypsky’s “street level
bureaucrats“ [18], influenced government thinking,
which resulted in the MOH drawing up a formal policy
for national scale-up and disseminating this through the
1996 Directive. Despite being a watershed, the 1996 pol-
icy was inadequate for replicating OSCCs - for reasons
that implementation theories, including Lipsky’s, help to
explain.
Second, the creation and scale-up of OSCCs was argu-
ably a mix between bottom-up and top-down
approaches, where initial agenda setting came from bot-
tom-up coalitions of NGO and health staff, while
detailed policy formulation was left to MOH. The initial
joint partnership between hospital front-line staff and
women’s NGOs was pivotal in bringing IPV onto the
policy agenda. On the other hand, although the formula-
tion of the 1996 policy itself was top-down and elabo-
rated by the MOH, it failed to provide the operational
details or resources to ensure policy implementation.
The sole policy document of 1996 had no clear objec-
tives, no proper guidance on replication, no funds, and
no monitoring system. Like many other studies and the-
ories, this case confirms the shortcomings of a top-
down approach that fails to engage the ‘street level
bureaucrats’ [30,32]. Moreover, the lack of allocated
budget devoted to the creation and expansion of the
OSCCs was equally to blame for the failure of the
implementation of the MOH policy.
Third, the NGO-health provider coalition was also not
successful in sustaining its influence through policy for-
mulation. During the establishment of the first OSCCs
the roles of NGOs had not been clearly defined and the
hospitals expected NGOs to take on more than they
could afford to and with no financial support from the
State. Once NGOs had been drawn into service imple-
mentation their public advocacy role declined which
affected public support. Moreover, a rift was opening up
between NGO and hospital staff over who should be
responsible for delivering and funding the non-clinical
services of the OSCCs, which meant NGOs lost their
influence at an advocacy or policy level. At the same
time, political concerns had moved away from DV and
by the late 1990s rolling out OSCCs was no longer a
priority for the MOH, losing what Hall calls “support”
or political will [15].
Another critical issue debated in the literature is
whether OSCCs are the best model to respond to IPV
[33], even if assuming the challenges identified in the
paper are dealt with. Little is published on OSCCs effec-
tiveness or other similar complex models of health care
response to IPV [9,10,33]. Existing evidence shows that
other entry points - such as primary health care, antena-
tal and family planning services - can be successful in
reaching women who experienced violence [34-36].
Most of the trial evidence in the North for system-based
interventions to improve health care responses to IPV
were based in primary care. Some of these may be more
relevant to low income countries than the acute sector-
based OSCC model.
However, it would be a pity to dismantle OSCC ser-
vices in Malaysia because of the paucity of evaluated
data. OSCCs should instead be developed and strength-
ened, especially at tertiary and secondary hospital level.
Efforts should also be putting in establishing new ser-
vices at primary health care. In Malaysia, if properly
resourced, OSCCs can provide effective care to abused
women, especially in rural areas where there are no
other services. Nonetheless, this model may not be feasi-
ble in low income countries where the health infrastruc-
ture, the human and financial resources are not
available to run such specialized and integrated
response, and primary care responses may be more
suitable.
Conclusions
There are a number of lessons from this case-study.
First, the Malaysia case shows how powerful a partner-
ship between NGOs and health staff can be for influen-
cing the legal and policy environment in which OSCCs
are developed. NGOs knew how to lobby government
and influence public opinion while senior hospital staff
were more influential with the MOH and provided pro-
fessional evidence of the need for specialist services.
Separately it is less likely they could have influenced
both the DV Act and the establishment of the OSCC
pilot. Second, it is of critical importance to gain high
level support from the Ministry of Health in order to
institutionalise the response across the entire health
care system. Without MOH buy-in and allocated
resources a national scale-up policy would not have
been developed. However, the challenge is to sustain
this support through to full implementation and secure
government commitment to properly resourcing the
OSCCs throughout the country. Reactivating the part-
nership between NGOs and hospital staff could be criti-
cal in achieving this.
Another critical issue to consider is whether the inte-
gration of OSCCs within A&E was a suitable way to deli-
ver services to abused women in a middle income
country. Given the Malaysian context, A&E represents
the best first entry point for many women as it is open 24
hours, no prior appointment is needed and there is at
least a semi-functioning OSCC network throughout the
country with many frontline staff still committed to pro-
viding services. However, primary health care responses
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to GBV should also be strengthened to create synergies
between the two approaches.
Endnotes
1. From interview with key informant from NGO in
Kuala Lumpur, April 2007 and email exchange with key
informant in Kelantan in August 2008.
2. This was despite having had operational procedures
on management of rape and other sexual violence abuse
since the late 1980s (Ministry of Health, Malaysia, 1988).
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